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Realizing the benefits of network-centric warfare—in terms of improved access to high-quality
information, speed of command, and dominant application of forces—will require a synergy
among three dimensions of change:  Technology, force organization, and team processes.  To
achieve the potential advantages of new technological capabilities requires that we reexamine old
rules of business and force-structures and recast them in ways that allow for increased flexibility
and application of force where and when it is required.  Experiments and exercises designed to
explore alternative structures, processes, and the impacts of information technologies are
complex, precisely because they force change in all three dimensions.  The challenge of
assessing the impacts of these changes in terms of individual, team, and overall organizational
performance, are great.  This paper describes an approach to dealing with the complexity of
assessment described above through the application of “bridge” experiments that start with a
blend of modeling and experimentation in the laboratory—to thoroughly explore core concepts
and test new assessment ideas under controlled conditions—and scale to meet the challenges of
field-level performance assessment by emphasizing those issues that proved to be performance
drivers in the laboratory.
1. Introduction
Realizing the benefits of network-centric warfare—in terms of improved access to high-quality
information, speed of command, and dominant application of forces—will require a synergy
among three dimensions of change:  Technology, force organization, and team processes.  To
achieve the potential advantages of new technological capabilities requires that we reexamine old
rules of business and force-structures and recast them in ways that allow for increased flexibility
and application of force where and when it is required.  Experiments and exercises designed to
explore alternative structures, processes, and the impacts of information technologies are
complex, precisely because they force change in all three dimensions.  The challenge of
assessing the impacts of these changes in terms of individual, team, and overall organizational
performance, are great.
This paper describes an approach to dealing with the complexity of assessment described above
through the application of “bridge” experiments that start with a blend of modeling and
experimentation in the laboratory—to thoroughly explore core concepts and test new assessment
ideas under controlled conditions—and scale to meet the challenges of field-level performance
assessment by emphasizing those issues that proved to be performance drivers in the laboratory.
The remainder of this paper discusses an application of this approach in preparation for the
Global Wargame, held at the Naval War College, in August of 1999.
2.  Bridge to Global
Three months prior to the Global ’99 Wargame, a team of warfighters, under the guidance of
CCG1 and collaborating researchers from the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control
(A2C2) project sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, conducted a training exercise at the
Naval Postgraduate School entitled “Bridge to Global ’99.”  Some of the objectives met by the
Bridge to Global (BTG) exercise were to provide training and exposure to alternative Joint Task
Force (JTF) command and control (C2) architectures; to observe the impacts of alternate JTF C2
architectures on command processes; to explore network-centric warfare (NCW) concepts and
technologies in a controlled setting; to validate and refine A2C2 organizational design
methodologies in operational settings with operational experts; and to explore the capabilities of
new information technology (IT21) tools as support for C2 information management and
decision making.
BTG provided a low-cost, feedback-rich environment in which to explore NCW and
organizational innovations with operational experts, and to collect, summarize, and feedback
data and observations to maximize the training impacts and lessons learned.  As a result, BTG
provided reliable insights concerning the efficiency of new organizational changes and
supporting technologies, many of which found their way into the Global ’99 game.
Additionally, BTG provided the A2C2 research team with a forum to explore new assessment
and performance measurement techniques in a rich context.  Lessons learned in this area have
helped the A2C2 team scale many of their laboratory-measurement and data-analysis methods to
the broader and more chaotic field setting of GLOBAL ’99.
During BTG, the A2C2 research team was able to employ a number of observational and survey
data collection methods to capture qualitative and quantitative performance data.  As the
command staff was observed playing the simulated wargame, the observation team collected
communications data, workload metrics, subjective and objective data about the tools used and
the methods tried to make the best use of available technologies, and subjective data about the
organizational impacts of these technologies.  At the end of each day, the observation team
briefed game players on the days results, and at the beginning of the next day, decisions were
made about ways to change organizational processes to improve performance.  The results of this
process, after a week, were a number of insights and “rules of business” that were taken to
Global Wargame.
2.1 Methods Used at BTG
The decision regarding appropriate data collection methods at BTG was a pragmatic one—the
assessment team collected data that could be quickly turned around as feedback to improve the
team’s communication processes and overall performance while remaining non-intrusive and
requiring minimal participation by the players.  Following are some of the data collection
techniques used.
2.1.1 Communication/Coordination
To study the team’s communication patterns and ability to coordinate, two members of the
assessment team used handheld computers with touch sensitive screens to record the type of
information transferred from one group within the team to another.  By using a Java applet
program, the observers were able to collect time-stamped data of team interaction simply by
tapping on a grid (see Figure 1) that specified type of information exchanged (i.e., request for
information, request for action or task, request for resource utilization, request for change,
transfer of information, statement about performing action or task, statement about using
resources, statement about changing, and any information technology (IT21) tool use) and the
source/destination dyad of that exchange (the groups within the team were called Flag (F), Alpha
Figure 1.  an example of a real-time data collection grid for team
communications
(A), Bravo (B), and Charlie (C); in the grid, “F/A” signifies that the information went from the
Flag cell to cell Alpha).
In addition to collecting the time-series data the data collection grid afforded, other members of
the assessment team kept detailed notes about specific communications from one cell to another.
These observers recorded the communications that took place when important events occurred
with a special focus on those communications concerning the IT21 tools, the organizational
structure, and team processes.
2.1.2 Teamwork Skills
Those same observers keeping detailed notes on specific communication interchanges also noted
specific teamwork behaviors such as the team’s coordination behavior (e.g., what were the
decision processes used to solve problems when they arise, what problems did the team
encounter in solving the problem, what were the positive aspects of their coordination behavior)
and IT21 tool use (e.g., what problems did they encounter and what protocol developed for the
tools use).  We also had the observers and each team member fill out a teamwork assessment
questionnaire that measured perceived team performance in communication behavior,
monitoring behavior, back-up (i.e., supporting) behavior, coordinating behavior, and team
orientation (e.g., placing team goals ahead of personal goals).
2.1.3 Workload
To measure workload, we used a revised version of the six item task load index (TLX) workload
questionnaire that measures each team member’s perceived task load in terms of mental demand,
physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration.  In the revised version,
we did not measure physical demand or performance, and we gathered information for self
workload, cell workload, and perceived workload for the other cells.
2.1.4 Situational Awareness
To determine situation awareness (SA) we used a self report instrument for which the
participants are asked to remember a specific salient event and describe what they and the other
team members were doing when that event occurred.
2.2 BTG Results
The above data collection techniques proved to be quite diagnostic regarding many facets of the
team’s performance – from the effects of diverse architectures to team information management.
Some of the most relevant findings are described below.
2.2.1 Diverse Architectures
Before attending BTG, members of the A2C2 team used mathematical modeling to generate
architectures that optimize spe d of command – the JTF organization must meet mission
objectives at maximum speed of command or op tempo, acceptable workload – workload should
be balanced across cells, effective team coordination – inter-cell coordination requirements
should be minimal, and supported-supporting relationships – the architecture should support
inter-cell interaction.  The optimized architectures for the two different phases of the BTG
scenario are shown in figure 2.  It was not surprising to find that the participants were generally
pleased with both architectures, rating them high on the effectiveness of that architecture to help
them complete their mission
tasks, perform alternative
strategies and maintain effective
communications and
coordination; what was surprising
was the finding that these
“optimal” architectures had some
detrimental effects:  as the
organizational structure reduces
the need for coordination, the
individuals within that
organization began to lose sight of
the common operational picture
(COP).  It was found that regular
e-briefings by each team to the
entire JTF was needed to maintain
global SA.
2.2.2 Adaptation
As is stated in Joint Vision 2010, it is imperative that organizations be flexible enough to adapt
to dynamic and diverse mission demands.  During BTG the research team monitored for such
adaptation – focusing on what enabled or hindered the necessary flexibility – and determined that
there are a number of factors that promote adaptation when present and hinder adaptation when
absent.  Some of the most important enablers were the commander’s intent and clarity of roles,
optimized C2 architecture, and real-time communications and shared awareness.  As long as the
participants knew what was expected of them in the mission, the C2 architecture was optimized
to meet mission demands, and the nodes within the team were able to communicate in real-time
to keep everyone alert and responsive to the present situation, the team was able to adapt to the
ever changing situation; if any of these enablers were missing the team was incapable of the
flexibility necessary to be optimally effective.
From the assessment team observations, it was further concluded the presence of enablers is
necessary but not sufficient to ensure successful adaptability; the team has to take a more
proactive role and begin the adaptation process before it is needed.  If the team waits until
change is absolutely necessary it is unlikely that they will be able to adapt in a timely manner.
Figure 2.  JTF C2 Architectures at BTG
Understanding the precursors to adaptation is in need of further study.  Although we were not
able to ascertain what specific predictors of the need for change were (e.g., an abrupt change in
the comm. traffic), we were able to conclude that the team needs to remain constantly aware of
future likely points of failure, the appropriateness of the distribution of personnel and skills for
current and future tasks, and the appropriateness of the asset/resource matches for current and
future tasks.
2.2.3 Team Coordination and Maintaining Situation Awareness
One requisite for effective team performance is shared situation awareness (SA).  With this in
mind, the participants of BTG were asked to rate a number of factors on their importance for
team coordination and maintaining a shared situation awareness, and the consensus was that real
time communications were the most important contributor for shared SA (as one of the
participants wrote on the survey, “Everything else is built on comms.”).  Preplanning and having
a common operational procedure were important also, but real time communications was
consistently rated the highest.
At BTG, the only true real-time communication were the voice comms, none of the others (e.g.,
chat, email, whiteboard) required the constant attention that helped the participants maintain a
shared SA.  Other than real-time communications, some enablers of team coordination and
shared SA are tool practice—participants needed ample opportunity to use the tools in the
contest of the wargame before they could achieve the tools’ full potential, model-based
architecture—the organizational structure specially modeled to enable team coordination was a
key component of the team’s success, and multiple IT21 tools—no one tool would have been
sufficient for all of the coordination and situation awareness needs.  This last point is explained
in more detail in the next section.
2.2.4 NCW IT tools
In BTG participants were dropped into the context of a complex wargame simulation and
provided with a range of digital tools for use in support of team awareness, communication, and
coordination, and collaboration.  At the start of BTG, the core command team was provided with
very little in the way of guidelines for employment of the new tools.  Instead, protocols and
patterns of effective usage were allowed to evolve.  Specifically, the BTG organization was
given a rich set of communication and collaboration tools that included audio communications,
real-time chat, email, shared whiteboard, shared map display, and videoconferencing (see Figure
3 for a screen shot of the IT21 tools used).  Each of these tools was trained in isolation until team
members understood the mechanics of use, but no specific guidelines were given about how the
team should use the tools to do their job.
Over the course of one week of game play, the command team evolved a number of patterns of
technology use that worked very well for the small team of thirty five players, and was well
suited to the dynamics of the scenarios played in the game (which were modeled after the
scenarios to be played during the larger Global Wargame several months later).  The emergent
protocols, which can be found in Figure 4, suggest that effective communication exists only
when the purpose of the communication is matched to the type of media.  For example, if the
communication is vital and must be attended to immediately, then the tool used must be voice
comms because that is the only communication venue available that fosters such immediate
attention; if a large file had to be sent as an attachment, email was used.  It is important to note
that the whiteboard appeared to have great potential in planning and maintaining shared SA;
however, the participants were least familiar with this tool and chose to use the other, more
familiar tools, instead.
Figure 3.  A screen shot of the IT21 tools.
3. Crossing the Bridge to Global Wargame
Based on the results of Bridge to Global, the A2C2 assessment team went to Global Wargame
’99 with custom tailored measures and a focus inspired by our experimental findings.  We
tailored our data collection and assessment efforts to capture impacts of information technologies
and collaborative tools (e.g. chat, shared COP) on team process and performance, and looked
closely at efforts made by the JTF and its subordinate cells to leverage these tools to accomplish
improved speed of command through an Effects-Based approach to Command and Control (C2).
3.1 Methods Used at Global
To provide adequate assessment coverage, a handful of raters from the A2C2 assessment team
attended GLOBAL ’99 where they used very similar collection techniques as those used for BTG
to gather information on teamwork skills, workload, and situational awareness; however, because
there were so many more players spread out over a much larger area, the data collection
technique for Communication/Coordination had to be revised.  Instead of relying on the
handheld computers to capture every information transaction, each member of the assessment
team was equipped with rating manuals specifically designed to capture interactions between
team members, team coordination behaviors, adaptations of the team architecture over time,
changes in command structure, and uses of IT21 tools (see Figure 5 for examples of pages from
the raters’ manuals).  Each rater—standing  in one of the following seven areas:  Current
Figure 4.  IT21 Tools:  Evolved Protocol and Perceived Importance
Operations, Future Operations, Effects Coordination Board, Network Operations Center,
Subordinate Joint Task Force (SJTF) A, SJTF B, SJTF C—compiled extensive observations on
the team interactions.
3.2 Lessons Learned
Four broad themes, or lessons learned, emerged from our observations, and these will be used to
provide a framework to organize this final discussion.  These themes were:
· The importance of training—While the BTG was a research experience for the A2C2
team, it was a valuable training experience for the command staff.  Without adequate, in-
context training, it is not possible for an organization to realize the promises of new
technologies.
· New tools require new rules—Just as there are certain kinds of meetings that just have to
be done face to face, there are certain kinds of messages that are better sent as email than
as a chat message.  Discovering, codifying, and adhering to rules and heuristics for tools
use can make it much easier for an organization to take advantage of these tools.
· The myth of “global situation awareness”—The global availability of information can
create an illusion that everyone knows what you know, and lead to errors of omission or
false expectations.  It is important that tools, plans, and other organizational methods be
used to insure that team members develop adequate understanding of one another roles,
information purview and information requirements.
Figure 5.  Rating Communication and Coordination in Global
 Information coming in
· Knowledge management may be a distinct organizational role—Particularly when the
size of an organization gets large (as in the Global Wargame) the job of managing all
potential sources of information, and making sure decision makers have access to what
they need when they need it, requires special expertise.  It is increasingly recognized that
the role of “knowledge manager” is an important new organizational role.
In the paragraphs that follow, we discuss these themes in greater depth, using examples from
BTG and Global wargame.
3.2.1 The Importance of Training
Changes in the availability of information and abilities of individuals to share what they know
across traditional boundaries alter organizational dynamics in a number of ways (Prest idge,
Hansen, Sessa, & Kossler, 1999).  To be successful, technological change must be accompanied
by other changes such as training, structural changes in the organization, and changes in the
processes and rules of business communication (Offermann & Eller, 1999; MacMillan, Paley,
Levchuk, & Serfaty, 1999).
The transition from BTG—where players were afforded individualized tool training with ample
feedback—to Global Wargame—where many of the players were exposed to network-based
communication and collaboration tools for the first time—made one thing very clear:  Quality
digital skills training, embedded in the context in which the tools will ultimately be used, is a
crucial determinant of an organization’s success in practice.  While it is not surprising to say that
training and practice lead to improved performance, the point goes deeper than that.  What BTG
provided was more than an opportunity to work hands-on with the tools:  It additionally provided
players with a cost-free, feedback rich, environment in which to explore different ways that the
tools might be used to practice C2.
There were two distinct types of training that took place at BTG.  The first was what is often
called “buttonology” training, or training in the mechanics of tool use.  The second, and arguably
more important, type of training was the in-context training, where new tools were truly tested
and experienced in the context of job performance.  In the transition from BTG to Global
Wargame, the assessment team was afforded a glimpse at the ramifications of providing one type
of training without the other.
At BTG, players received hands-on buttonology training early in the week, to familiarize them
with the mechanics of the tools, their capabilities, and a few suggestions about how they might
be employed.  Players started chat groups, joined and left them, set up email addresses, tested
their video connections, and interacted with the white board and shared map displays.  After they
were familiar with the tools, the simulation game started, and players were faced with the task of
figuring out how to use all of these new capabilities to help them work.  This “free-form” phase
was training in the sense that, though they were left to their own sense of how to proceed, the
observation team was present to collect data on their progress and choices, and summarized this
material as structured feedback and a framework for self reflection.  This provided the command
staff the ability to chart their own progress with the tools and actively participate in the
development of rules of conduct and best practice for tool use.  The products of this effort are
discussed in the following section.
When the BTG group went to Global Wargame, they were some of the only players who had
been afforded opportunities to work with new technologies in the context of their work, and it
showed.  As is too often the case, the Global Wargame developers scheduled time for tool
training early in the week, but focused exclusively on butonol gy, with no time for structured,
in-context tool training.  As you might expect, four hundred people, sharing time on fewer than
four hundred computer screens, in an attempt to learn how to use an arsenal of new tools to help
them do their job, was less than perfectly effective.  As the game designers quickly learned,
valuable game time ended up being used as training time, during which players really educated
themselves about the ways new technologies can be used to help them conduct C2.
As will become evident in the following sections, the training required to blend new technologies
with changes in organizational structure and organizational processes only happens when the
buttonology is over and the organization puts new technologies to the test, in context.  A major
lesson learned from the BTG and Global Wargame experience is that in-context tool use,
coupled with data collection, structured feedback, and ample self reflection are required to
develop, agree to, and codify organizational rules of practice that allow team members to
fearlessly utilize new tools in ways that they are confident will be consistent with their
teammates understanding of the models of communication and collaboration adopted by the
organization.  These rules of practice derived in the context of C2 have already been discussed
and are further detailed in the next section.
3.2.2 New Tools Require New Rules
Just as there are certain kinds of meetings that just have to be done face to face, there are certain
kinds of messages that are better sent as email than as a chat message.  Discovering, codifying,
and adhering to rules and heuristics for tools use can make it much easier for an organization to
take advantage of these tools.
A primary finding from our exploratory research has been that the proliferation of new
communication and coordination supporting tools requires a brand new set of rules, protocols,
and guidelines-for-use to help teams understand when and how best to use them.  Each of the
tools mentioned differs in the time they take to employ, the delays associated with message
delivery, bandwidth requirements, and invasiveness (to name a few).
To be used effectively, the team required a rudimentary set of guidelines for how to utilize their
new tools to get the job done.  Over the course of four days of mission practice, the team
developed a simple protocol (outlined in figure 3) in which email was restricted to cases in which
the message to be sent had multiple recipients and an attached file such as a map or target list.
Chat sessions turned out to be key as a means of providing a running record of organizational
activities, and this tool evolved into a multipurpose communication channel that kept the radios
free for other varieties of communication.  Video turned out to be too much trouble in the heat of
battle, but it was suggested that this technology will be crucial in planning.  The whiteboard was

















































they cited their unfamiliarity with the tool as being an insurmountable obstacle to its use in the
fast paced wargame (again, this simply re-emphasizes the need for proper training in tool use and
protocol).  These protocols were further tested and refined several months later in the larger
Global ’99 wargame.
While many organizations have long histories of audio communications as a primary means of
coordinating distributed team members, the protocols and methods that have grown up around
the radio are not always the best fit for collaboration supported by new, network-based tools.
With continued use, new rules are evolving for email, chat, videoconferencing, shared graphics
spaces (i.e. whiteboards and common map displays) and other network communication tools.
3.2.3 The myth of “global situation awareness”
The ability to stay informed, and up-to-date is a promise that has long been associated with
network-based computer services, particularly with the advent of the internet and associated
technologies such as personalization and information push.  In military C2 contexts, this promise
is often exaggerated still further to suggest that every person will have access to all possible
information, and will therefore be constantly “situationally aware.”  This myth can be hazardous
for several reasons:  It can lead the belief that others know things that they do not and thus cause
individuals to develop expectations about behaviors that won’t happen, it can cause individuals
to push unintelligible data to others, or it can lead to omissions on the assumption that
information available to one is available to all and therefore not worth sending.  Regardless of
the outcome, the myth of global situation awareness can impact the ability of the organization to
stay informed, coordinate activities, and manage information.
The A2C2 team observed several interesting themes related to the myth of global awareness, but
two stand out as particularly relevant in the context of organizational change:  The importance of
information management skills and training, and the multi-source nature of what the military
refers to as the “common operating picture.”  These will be discussed in turn.
Information management and
organizational knowledge
Understanding how to manage
information in an organizational context
requires more than a passing familiarity
with the “cc” function in an email client.
Managing information well requires
information filtering, fusion, push, and
pull, all informed by knowledge of
organizational roles and shared goals.
As can be seen in Figure 4, some of the
most troublesome barriers to proper
information access has to do with not
knowing where to get information and
inadequate responses to information
requests.  With proper training and
organizational knowledge, these two barriers can be overcome.
Information Overload and the Common Operating Picture  One of the key findings of our
research was that, with the increasing number of information sources available in the modern
work environment, no one tool can any longer be counted on as the single source for keeping the
team up-to-date and coordinated.  The military concept of a “common operating picture” may
not be a picture in the graphic sense at all, in fact.  Rather, the common operating picture is a
sense of shared awareness fostered by the collection of globally available information sources
and tools.
3.2.4 Knowledge management may be a distinct organizational role
Particularly when the size of an organization gets large (as in the Global Wargame) the job of
managing all potential sources of information, and making sure decision makers have access to
what they need when they need it, requires special expertise.  It is increasingly recognized that
the role of “knowledge manager” is an important new organizational role.  Because of this, the
assessment team decided that it may be necessary to dedicate an individual or team of people as
knowledge managers whose sole job it is to monitor multiple information sources, interpret and
disseminate data and information in support of the team.  In the context of the military wargame
a new cell, the Network Operations Center (NOC), was developed to look at communication
traffic patterns and flow in the IT21 tools to optimize “smart push – smart pull” to make sure the
players are not looking at old information.
The NOC was implemented in Global ’99 but was not a successful knowledge manager; instead,
a couple of players who were extremely knowledgeable about both the job that needed to be
done, as well as the information networking operations being used, rose to the occasion and
filled the knowledge management void.  It appears as though just knowing the information flow
and traffic patterns is not enough to guarantee knowledge management, a solid understanding of
the job—or the context in which the knowledge is to be used—is needed for proper information
management.  Next year, for Global ’00, one person in every cell will be thoroughly trained in
both the job that the cell is responsible for as well as in the information technology being used.
This person will be the knowledge manager for their particular cell.  Similar positions would be
of use in nonmilitary organizations to make sure organizational members are kept up-to-date
with information relevant for their organizational position.  This person must be more than a
systems administrator who, like the NOC, would know the information network but not the
specific jobs; this person must be thoroughly knowledgeable of the job if s/he is to successfully
manage the knowledge.
One further interpretation of the above findings—that the knowledge managers rose not from the
network administrators whose job it is to oversee all information flow, but from players who just
happened to have access to all the information because of the omnipresent information flow—is
that network communications tools can flatten an otherwise hierarchical organization by
providing a conduit for rapid information dissemination anywhere in the team.  Thus, we found
that collaborative tools can have impacts at the organizational level in ways that radio never had.
4.  Conclusion
Building adaptive organizations is proving to be quite a challenge, requiring simultaneous
improvements among the three dimensions of organizational structure, team process, and
information technology.  The experiments and studies designed to explore changes in these three
dimensions are quite complex, and span the entire experimental research design arena from basic
research to laboratory experiments to field research practiced in wargam s such as Global ’99.
Studies that test the models developed in basic research in such a way that the models can be
improved upon and scaled up for larger w ames are essential if we are to successfully
implement new concepts along all three dimensions—BTG proved to be such a study. Not only
did BTG allow for more control than is possible in the operational exercises—allowing the
participants to get much needed practice and feedback, but it provided more realistic situations
than the usual lab experiment—allowing for the testing of hypotheses, theories, and models in a
more realistic setting, and it shortened tool familiarization time at Global so the assessment team
could test and adapt NCW architectures—which requires that the participants already be trained
in them.  “Lesson’s learned” from BTG and Global are discussed in this paper and are intended
to recount the findings from BTG and Global, and serve as initial guidelines to help researchers
determine how to realize the full benefits of NCW.
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